When We Hold No Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief, Trust, and the Decline in Trials by Bingham, Lisa Blomgren
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2006 Issue 1 Article 11 
2006 
When We Hold No Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief, Trust, 
and the Decline in Trials 
Lisa Blomgren Bingham 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We Hold No Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief, Trust, and the Decline 
in Trials, 2006 J. Disp. Resol. (2006) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2006/iss1/11 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
When We Hold No Truths to be Self-
Evident: Truth, Belief, Trust, and the
Decline in Trials
Lisa Blomgren Bingham*
In A World Without Trials?, Professor Marc Galanter documents a decline in
both the absolute number and rate of civil trials and jury trials in state and federal
courts, a decline that is both long-term over the past century and yet precipitous in
the past two decades.' He identifies five 'vanishing trial stories' as hypotheses to.
explain the phenomenon: convergence of common law and civil code systems;
displacement of trials to administrative, arbitral, and other dispute resolution
mechanisms; assimilation of trial-like procedures and due process into surround-
ing institutions other than courts; transformation of the legal system from a ra-
tional, rule-centered and formal system into an informal decisional process entail-
ing negotiation, participation, and interaction; and evolution of an adversarial
process into something different, entailing process pluralism 'intelligently de-
signed' to produce more optimal outcomes. There is, of course, some basis for
each of these accounts.
There is also a paradox of life in the modem world that underlies all of these
hypotheses. The more information we have, the less we seem to know. We have
too much information; we no longer know who to believe or what to trust, includ-
ing our senses. We have lost confidence in the capacity of judges and jurors,
among many other institutions, to determine the truth. In response, we are assert-
ing more control over our sources of information, filtering information out, and
trying to control the information we want used in disputing. We are trying to
assert control over the process for deciding the outcomes of disputes as a way of
managing how the decision-maker responds to information. We are turning to
expert tribunals and decision-makers, people with substantive knowledge to better
interpret the information we give them. Perhaps a by-product is the decline in the
frequency and number of traditional civil adversarial trials.
This article will explore the relationship between the "vanishing trial" and the
changing ways in which we think about truth. First, it briefly overviews how we
think about knowing what is true: epistemology and the history of philosophy.
Second, it looks to the philosophy of science and history of social science for new
theories and methods about how we ascertain and construct meaning and what we
believe to be real and true. Third, it examines our changing relation to informa-
tion in the face of the "information explosion": information is the evidence upon
which we reach a conclusion about what is true. Fourth, it relates these changes to
* The author gratefully acknowledges support by a grant from the William and Flora Hewlett
Foundation to the Indiana Conflict Resolution Institute at Indiana University. I wish to thank Tina
Nabatchi, doctoral candidate, for her research assistance. I also thank Professors Marc Galanter and
John Lande for many wonderful, thoughtful, and stimulating conversations that converged here. I am
solely responsible for any errors.
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the philosophy of law and theories of the jury and adversary system. Fifth, it ex-
amines what social science has taught us about truth, belief, trust, justice, and
control over information. Finally, it addresses how these changes may explain
why litigants are using mediation, arbitration, and other forms of appropriate dis-
pute resolution in lieu of the adversarial civil trial.
People are choosing to exercise control over what information is used in dis-
puting and over who is using it for what purposes. This takes them away from the
civil trial, a formalistic process with strict rules about who can be a witness, what
they can say on the stand, what information is admitted as relevant and material to
a decision, and what standards the decision-maker must use to evaluate that in-
formation. If complexity in the modern world has taught us anything, it is that we
no longer hold much to be self-evident.
I. EPISTEMOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY OF KNOWLEDGE: TRUTH BECOMES
IRRELEVANT
Law has always borne a special relation to that study known as philosophy,
the love of wisdom.2 Law entails the exercise of judgment, discerning what is real
and true in an account of events, identifying the evidence and people we believe
or disbelieve, and the practical wisdom to know the difference. Western philoso-
phy3 gives us two distinct traditions for understanding what is true and how we
know it to be so: Platonic rationalism and Aristotelian empiricism. Plato posited
that the ultimate reality is found in the forms, ideas that exist apart from the mate-
rial world, and which we can but barely discern, as shadows on the walls of a
cave. Aristotle posited that we identify truths about reality when we generalize
from a sequence of observations in the material world. Together, these create the
"mind-body problem," which in turn has attracted loyal adherents to one side or
the other through the history of philosophy. In the rationalist or mind side of the
tradition, St. Thomas Aquinas reasoned into existence a complex theocratic real-
ity; Descartes famously observed, "Cogito ergo sum"; and Immanuel Kant as-
serted a priori the indivisible autonomy of the individual as the basis for an ethical
philosophy.4 The rationalist tradition is also an authoritarian one. Truth exists
independently from us; the divine know it, even if we may not. In the rationalist
tradition, we looked to their representatives on earth to tell it to us. 5 They discov-
ered it through contemplation; they trusted neither their senses, nor ours, to reveal
it.
In contrast, the empiricists discover truth through observation and ultimately,
science. Truth exists independently from us, but it is based in the material world,
not in our heads. The British Empiricists, John Locke, George Berkeley, and
2. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 104-13 (1999).
3. Eastern philosophy did not play a formative role in the common civil justice system, although it
may have informed certain early Greek pre-Socratic philosophers.
4. JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM: MODERNISM AND THE CRISIS OF
KNOWLEDGE AND AUTHORITY 428 (1994) (describing Descartes's "logocentrism," and that "reason
logically preceded language and that objects cognitively presided in the mind, a rationalism that Kant
continued by making consciousness and intentionality the focus of knowledge").
5. John Dewey, The Construction of Good, in THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS, 201-02 (Milton R.
Convitz & Gail Kennedy eds., 1960).
[Vol. 2006
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David Hume, all give priority to our senses. Hume asserted that we cannot think
of something unless it has an antecedent in our sense perception. We can deter-
mine what is true through the exercise of careful observation and the scientific
method. We cannot simply trust ourselves to reason our way there.
Both traditions posit that truth exists objectively outside of us and that it may
be knowable. However, both traditions lend themselves to authoritarianism. The
wise can contemplate their way to truth; the scientists can discover it. Both of
these are better at finding truth than the average person.
In sharp contrast, the American pragmatists developed a new empirical phi-
losophy of knowing. 6 William James, Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey posited
that truth is a function of belief based on interaction between people and their
environment; it is subject to revision.7 A hallmark of truth is the utility and prac-
ticality of it.8 Essentially, truth is a belief structure, a function of humans acting in
relation to information.9 We use information through our relation to the world as
organisms in our environment and thereby construct knowledge.' 0 What is impor-
tant is how information is used. Truth is a function of the dominant shared belief
and its hallmark is utility-that it moves us forward." This is fundamentally a
democratic construction of truth; average people can know it based on its useful-
ness to them and whether a majority of them accept it. However, with more in-
formation, our assessment of what is true will, and should, change. There was
some criticism that the pragmatists confused truth with justification; Dewey ar-
gued philosophers should focus not on truth, but on 'warranted assertibility.
' 12
This is an "instrumental approach to knowledge."'
' 3
Oliver Wendell Holmes brought this philosophical background into American
law.' 4 Holmes rejected "the deductive method of formal logic."' 5 Instead, he
asserted that the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."'1
6
Pragmatism is fundamentally consistent with the trial jury; a dozen average people
can, based on empirical information (i.e., evidence, and experience with how the
world works), determine with reasonable likelihood that they believe certain as-
serted facts are true.' 7 In fact, "twelve good men [sic] and true" are better at de-
termining truth in this framework than a cleric on a mountaintop.
s
6. Id.
7. WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING; POPULAR
LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY 53 (1907) ("Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification proc-
esses.... Truth is made, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.").
8. Id. at 46.
9. Charles S. Peirce, The Fixation of Belief, 12 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 1, 1-15 (Nov. 1877).
10. Dewey, supra note 5, at 201-02 ("Judgments about values are judgments about the conditions
and results of experienced objects; judgments about that which should regulate the formation of our
desires, affections and enjoyments.").
11. William James, Truth and its Misunderstanderers, in THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS 68 (Milton
R. Convitz & Gail Kennedy eds., 1960) ("Realities are not true, they are, and beliefs are true of
them.").
12. RORTY, supra note 2, at 32.
13. DIGGINS, supra note 4, at 2.
14. Milton R. Convitz & Gail Kennedy, THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS 143 (1960)
15. DIGGINS, supra note 4, at 343 (characterizing Dewey's praise of Holmes).
16. Id. at 342 (quoting Holmes).
17. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Best Test of Truth..., in THE AMERICAN PRAGMATISTS 170
(Milton R. Convitz & Gail Kennedy eds., 1960) ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to
No. 11
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The pragmatists were succeeded by the neo-pragmatists. They argued that
"inquiry [is] a way of using reality," there is no one "Way the World Is," and
therefore knowledge cannot represent reality. 19 Instead, justified belief helps us
act in order to realize happiness. In fact, certainty is neither possible nor neces-
sary:
To say one should replace knowledge by hope is to say ...that one
should stop worrying about whether what one believes is well grounded
and start worrying about whether one has been imaginative enough to
think up interesting alternatives to one's present beliefs.20
In addition, poststructuralists contributed to the conclusion that: "[T]he
search for truth must be forsaken as a quaint illusion from a previous age of inno-
cence. In the absence of knowledge the world consists in structures of domination
that move almost invisibly without any apparent human agent.",
21
Instead of truth, we are left with language, culture, context, history, and
power. While this reflects primarily an elite discussion within the academy, it has
also found its way into popular culture and debate. Typically, it is reduced to
political challenges of 'moral relativism' compared to 'moral values,' an increas-
ingly central debate between the right and left. That it is present in popular cul-
ture is a testament to the power of the ideas.
22
II. HISTORY OF SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: TRUTH BECOMES
INACCESSIBLE TO THE AVERAGE JOE OR JANE
The history of science gives us a parallel narrative on truth. In Kuhn's Struc-
ture of Scientific Revolutions he describes how scientific theories evolve in an
alternation of deductive and inductive reasoning, neither form of learning having
primacy. Scientists observe phenomena in the world starting from a set of expec-
tations or hypotheses that are derived from beliefs and preconceptions. They col-
lect data. With the accumulation of a sufficient body of disconfirming or incon-
sistent information, and changes in social and cultural conditions, there can be a
'paradigm shift,' through which scientists, and all of us, adopt a new belief about
reality. Neither belief is necessarily objective truth. The paradigm shift is not
linear; rather, it is a kind of 'tipping point.' It is not necessarily cumulative. Gali-
leo, Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Johannes Kepler illustrate the shift from an
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.").
18. DIGGINS, supra note 4, at 344 ("Thus in legal philosophy as well as in pragmatic philosophy the
search for truth becomes the struggle for acceptance, whether in the marketplace, the committee, the
courts, the schools, or the broader popular culture.").
19. RORTY, supra note 2, at 33.
20. Id. at 34.
21. DIGGINS, supra note 4, at 434.
22. Mitchell Stephens, We're All Postmodern Now; Even Journalists Have Realized that Facts
Don't Always Add Up to the Truth, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REv., Jul.-Aug. 2005, at 60 (arguing that
journalism needs to debunk spin and be good postmodernists who seek truth rather than just report
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earth-centered to a sun-centered solar system, and from one positing planetary
motion in perfect spheres to an accurate account of planetary motion. In each
shift, an entrenched view of truth about reality yielded in a dramatic shift to a new
view. Science moved forward from the rationalism of mathematics and physics to
the empiricism of astronomy, chemistry, and biology, and then the science of the
mind, psychology. Kuhn helped break down the hierarchy of disciplines and
methods, to open up discussion about the way human language, culture, and belief
shape science.
23
One of pragmatism's founders, William James, was not only a philosopher,
but also one of the founders of experimental psychology. Experimental psychol-
ogy endeavored to study systematically how it is that we perceive our world and
make sense of it, yielding us perception, neuro-psychology, neuroscience, social
psychology, and cognitive science, with its feet in both the camps of computer
science and psychology. The development of this discipline paralleled that of
epistemology. While all of the discipline used empirical methods, there was a
mind-body divide in interpreting the results. Neo-rationalists argued that the brain
is hard-wired, that we match what we see to images in the brain to interpret them.
Radical empiricists argued that the brain develops by the organism interacting
with the environment and building a body of sense-derived knowledge. More
recently, with the advent of experiments with psychotropic drugs, some argue we
see what we can use; we pay attention to information important to survival, sort-
ing it out from a rich array of incoming sense data. Survival means not paying
attention to all of it; hence, we have scientists studying attention. Magnetic imag-
ing of brain activity during various tasks attempts to pinpoint where and how in-
teracting with the environment may create knowledge.
At a fundamental level, as organic features of organisms acting in relation to
an environment that we have evolved in, our senses provide us with the informa-
tion we need to survive. However, as this discipline has systematically explored
the human mind, we have learned about various illusions and ways in which our
senses are unreliable.
Moreover, all scientific disciplines have progressed to levels of complexity
unknowable by the layperson. Biotechnology has given us DNA sequencing and
analysis as a tool in the courtroom. Computer science gives us new tools that
operate seemingly magically through invisible bodies of code. Statistics permit
sophisticated arguments about inference and causality.24 Using these tools, ex-
perts can tell juries to disregard what a common sense assessment of the evidence
might dictate as an outcome. A series of high profile exonerations using DNA
23. Thomas Kuhn, Rocks and the Laws of Physics, in PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 181 (1999).
Kuhn relates:
All of the social sciences, and all of the learned professions, have by now gone through a
process of Kuhnianization, marked by an increased willingness to admit that there is no sin-
gle model for good work in an academic discipline, and the criteria for good work have
changed throughout the course of history, and probably will continue to change.
24. Joseph Saunders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial
Processes, 48 DEPAuL L. REv. 355, 363 (1998) ("[Tihe most difficult type of evidence for jurors is that
containing statistical and technical information."). For a discussion about the growing complexity of
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testing of criminals condemned to die have brought home again and again the
unreliability of the adversarial process.
In the past century and a half, the social sciences have come into their own.
The systematic study of human relations in a myriad of cultural contexts through
anthropology, sociology, and political science has given us theories about the
human construction of meaning. Americans no longer share a single cultural
frame of reference as the correct or only frame. We know it is possible for people
to construct meaning very differently from each other. With names like decon-
structionism and postmodernism, these theories illustrate our loss of shared belief
structures and the fragmentation of what we know and believe to be true along
political, religious, racial, ethnic, gender, gender preference, and other ideological
lines.
III. INFORMATION: WE NOT ONLY CANNOT SEE THE FOREST FOR THE
TREES, WE HAVE BECOME LEAF PEOPLE
A. The Information Explosion
The phrase 'information explosion' is commonplace, but accurately captures
an aspect of our reality. Technology for humans to communicate with each other
has evolved fundamentally, in ways unforeseen and unknowable when the com-
mon law adversary system first emerged. The means of communication have
moved from localized forms like speech, signal fires, and drums to distributable
physical forms, like handbills, printed books, journals, magazines, papers, re-
cordings, and tape. We have moved from purely local to mass publication and
worldwide distribution networks of these physical forms. In the past thirty years,
we have shifted to digital media, subject to both physical and digital worldwide
distribution. We have moved from speech through air to communication through
satellites and fiber optic cable in cyberspace and on the Internet. As the means
have evolved, so too has the speed of communication, from weeks or months on
foot or horse, to days or weeks on train, to hours or days by plane, to minutes and
hours by telegraph, to nearly simultaneous by telephone, satellite, and fiber-optic
cable. We can communicate around the planet within seconds. We can watch
reality unfold in real time in places we have never been and never will be.
This has included a proliferation of sources. Our sources of information
about what is real and true no longer come from just church and/or a sovereign,
but now from different levels and agencies of government, public and private
schools, colleges and universities, an array of houses of worship, the many entities
in the private and nonprofit sectors, civil society, voluntary associations, unions,
public interest groups, political parties, and individuals, among others. The last
decade has also seen the ground-up democratization of information. Anyone can
set up a website and publish information to the world. There is no licensing proc-
ess, as there is for radio, TV, cable, or satellite communications. Bloggers tell us
daily what is happening in Iraq. We have more access to eye witness evidence
about events around the world, and how others interpret them and understand
reality, than we have ever before had in human history.
It is too much to know; this vast, geometrically increasing body of informa-
tion is fundamentally unknowable. Once upon a time, reading a daily paper was
(Vol. 2006
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sufficient to be well informed. Now, there is little consensus on what it means to
be well informed, because there is no consensus on the right source of informa-
tion. Instead, the focus has turned away from keeping up with information to
filtering it out efficiently. An article in a recent in-flight magazine interviewed
eight professionals and executives on how they decide what information to con-
sume and what to screen out and ignore.25 This is not a problem that was much in
evidence at the turn of the last century, at the beginning of our decline in trials.
B. The Failure of Information Filtering Institutions: The Implosion of
Journalism
As information becomes easier to access, as sources proliferate, demand for it
from historic sources diminishes. There has been a loss of monopoly. Neither
churches nor government nor network TV can claim supremacy in credibility. TV
journalism presents a case in point. The era of a single or even a handful of au-
thoritative voices is over. We had Edward R. Murrow in the 1950s, Walter
Cronkite in the 1960s and 1970s, and the triumvirate of Dan Rather, Tom Brokaw,
and the late Peter Jennings in the 1980s and 1990s. 26 However, with their retire-
ment, there is fragmentation of audience. The national TV networks have seen a
diminution of their audience with the advent of cable and on-demand TV; less
than half of those surveyed recently reported that they regularly get news or in-
formation from the national nightly network stations.27 The newspapers, even the
national newspapers of record, are struggling with declining subscriber bases as
people elect to get their information elsewhere. 28 One survey of internet use
found that people went online to get news because they could get information on
the Web not available elsewhere (9 percent), it was more convenient (50 percent),
the sources reflected their own interests and values (6 percent), and they do not
get all the news and information they want from traditional news sources such as
29the daily newspapers or the network television news (33 percent).
25. Jenna Schnuer, Our Daily Read, AMERCAN WAY, Jan. 1, 2006 available at http:// american-
waymag.con/aw/lifestyle/feature.asp?archive date=1/1/2006 (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) ("Information
overload getting you down? These readers learned to control the flow and dumped the pileup guilt.").
26. Shari Wolk, Rather on Rather: 50 Years of Journalism, THE DAILY COLONIAL [GWU] Sept. 27,
2005 (observing that many are calling the stepping down of Tom Brokaw, Dan Rather, and the death
of Peter Jennings 'the end of an era'); and David Bianculli, Two are Top of the 'World,' DAILY NEWS,
Dec. 6, 2005, at 61, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/gossip/story/372126p316
468c.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2006) (reporting on new co-anchors taking over from Peter Jennings and
observing that evening newscasts' audience levels have dropped, and that there is no "pool of potential
anchors with Dan Rather-type gravitas," so they are revamping the show with blogs and complemen-
tary internet materials).
27. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL INTERNET TRACKING POLL, Question ID USPSRA.122104,
R46B (2004). Forty-five percent report regularly watching CBS, ABC, or NBC, while 38 percent
report regularly getting news or information from cable news channels such as CNN, MSNBC, or the
Fox News Cable Channel. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R46C (2004). The good news is that
15 percent reported regularly getting their news from National Public Radio. Id. at Question ID
USPSRA.122104, R46D (2004). However, a majority, 58 percent said they sometimes or regularly go
to the major network and cable websites for news. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R47H.
28. Only 10 percent report they regularly get news or information from the New York Times or
USA Today. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R47B.
29. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R38.
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Although two-thirds of Americans report that they regularly get information
from local television news,30 and more than half say they regularly get news from
a local daily newspaper, 31 there is a perceived failure of local journalism to main-
tain its independence and serve its historic role as a watchdog at the local and
community level. Mergers and the emergence of a few giant media conglomer-
ates have undermined resources for reporting on news that has only a local or
regional market as opposed to a national market.
Moreover, there has been a shift away from reporting real news to infomer-
cials and commercialized news: journalism as marketing. This is illustrated by
the move from news shows to celebrity news and news magazines, by constant
product placements in morning shows and cross marketing of regular TV pro-
gramming through guest appearances at special event coverage like the Macy's
Thanksgiving Day Parade. This in turn has generated a loss of faith in the authen-
ticity of information.
32
One short cut is subjective faith in the source. As an illustration, one survey
examined how much trust people have in various sources to provide accurate in-
formation about health problems or issues, a subject of importance to them. Sev-
enty percent of those polled responded that they had a lot of trust in doctors and
health care professionals, 33 while the response for pharmacists was 53 percent,
34
and for friends and family was 25 percent.35 In contrast, all forms of media rated
much lower for the response "trust a lot"; books rated 23 percent, 36 the Internet 1437 38 39 4
percent, magazines 10 percent, television 10 percent, newspapers 7 percent,4
and radio 5 percent.4' People have more faith in traditional authority figures like
doctors than in the work product of journalism. Another poll found that people
are more willing to trust religious leaders (51 percent) and military or police lead-
ers (45 percent) than they are to trust journalists (28 percent) whose job it is to tell
the truth in a disinterested and presumably objective fashion.42 Even after Enron,
people were more willing to trust business leaders (31 percent) than journalists (28
percent) or politicians (23 percent).43 In a separate national adult survey, only 30
30. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R46A.
31. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R47A.
32. For a discussion of recent scandals and ethics in journalism, see Marianne M. Jennings, Where
are our Minds and What are we Thinking? Virtue Ethics for a "Perfidious" Media, 19 N.D. J. LEGAL
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 637 (2005).
33. Roper Center at the University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL E-HEALTH AND THE ELDERLY: How SENIORS USE THE
INTERNET FOR HEALTH INFORMATION SURVEY, Question ID USPSRA.05EHLTH, RO5A (2005).
34. Id. at RO5B.
35. Id. at R051.
36. Id. at R05E.
37. Id. at R05F.
38. Id. at R05D.
39. Id. at R05G.
40. Id. at R05C.
41. Id. at R05H.
42. Roper Center at the University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, ROPER ASW PUBLIC
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percent of the population reported that they think that all or most of what televi-
sion reporters say is the truth;44 newspaper reporters fared worse (28 percent).45
A related development is the perceived use of disinformation and misinfor-
mation for political purposes. This includes, but goes beyond, the phenomenon of
spin, in which an agreed set of events is given a particular interpretation. 46 For
example, there is discussion of the failure of traditional journalism in relation to
the Iraq war, 47 in both the reporting on claims that Iraq had weapons of mass de-
struction and in challenging Bush administration assertions about the relation of
the Iraq war to the war on terrorism.48 More recently, government agencies have
created 'journalistic' footage, supposed news releases in which an agency has
entirely created and filmed the footage subsequently released by news media as
original journalism, rather than government-produced public relations. Another
recent poll asked a national sample of registered voters who they trust more to tell
the public the truth, government officials or news reporters, and the results were
that only 18 percent of people trust government, while 38 percent trust reporters, 5
percent trust both, and 33 percent trust neither.49
C. The Disintegration of Shared Knowledge
People are choosing whom they want to believe. This has always been true to
a certain extent, but there were fewer people to choose from. With the failure of
traditional filtering mechanisms in the face of the information explosion, the loss
of monopoly, the weakening of historic sources through massive competition, the
restructuring of the information marketplace, and in light of the paradigm shift in
epistemology, people are using heuristics, or shortcuts, for truth.
In the more value-laden area of public policy and politics, they go to the in-
formation sources they want to or are disposed to believe, and they reject and
filter out information inconsistent with their existing ideological frame. A major-
ity of those polled went online for information about the 2004 election cam-
paign, 50 but it is telling that a majority (60 percent) of them did not bother to
44. Roper Center at the University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, CENTER FOR SURVEY
RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT NEWSPAPER EDITORS SURVEY, Question ID
USCSRA.03MEDIA, ROF (2003).
45. Id. at USCSRA.03MEDIA, ROIB.
46. Jacob Weisberg, Beyond Spin: The Propaganda Presidency of George W. Bush, SLATE
MAGAZINE, Dec. 8, 2005, available at http://www.slate.con/id/23117868/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2006)
(observing that propaganda and spin exist on a continuum, but that they differ in that spin does not
involve lying or misleading anyone about factual matters).
47. James Wolcott, Flooding the Spin Zone: Stunned by the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, the Media
Came out of its Defensive Crouch and Lambasted Washington, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2005, at 176 (com-
paring the media's aggressive reporting of Hurricane Katrina to its failure of journalism with the inva-
sion of Iraq).
48. Id. (describing the Bush administration's 'information war'). See also Chris Lehmann, Rumsfeld
Guns for the Press While the Lincoln Group Spins, NAT'L. OBSERVER, Dec. 12, 2005, at 4 (describing
propaganda placed in Iraqi press by Bush administration).
49. Roper Center at the University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, FOX NEWS/OPINION
DYNAMICS POLL, Question ID USODFOX.072805, R35 (2005).
50. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL INTERNET TRACKING POLL, Question ID USPSRA.122104,
RWIB (2004). In the same poll, 43 percent said they went to the websites of major news organizations
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check the accuracy of claims made by or about the candidates. 51 They can find
radio show hosts52 and bloggers who share their viewpoint. 53 In a recent survey,
42 percent of those responding somewhat agreed or strongly agreed that they rely
heavily on independent sources like Internet chat rooms, blogs, or other alterna-
tive media to get news and information.- 4 It is interesting that 14 percent of those
polled in another national survey responded that they thought they could trust
partisan web sites such as those run by political parties, a candidate or a campaign
to provide information that is accurate and not misleading just about always or
most of the time, although 47 percent responded that you could only trust these
sites some of the time. 55 A higher percentage, 21 percent, said they could trust
websites run by groups focused on specific issues such as the environment, gun
control, abortion, or health care reform to provide accurate information just about
always or most of the time; a majority said they trusted these sites only some of
the time.56 Ten years ago, these information sources would not have been avail-
able.
It is true that when national disasters unfold in real time and they become the
subject of 24/7 news coverage on CNN, the networks and their websites, they will
attract a national audience. 57 However, that audience dissipates once the emer-
gency is over. These are at best temporary exceptions to the rule. They are in-
variably followed by commentary on how the country came together in the face of
the disaster, and then the national unity evaporates as commentators pick apart
who is to blame for the disaster, its handling or the consequences, with the cus-
tomary fragmentation along political lines.
like CNN or the New York Times, while a total of 19 percent indicated they went to candidate, politi-
cal, issues-oriented, or other websites. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R32.
51. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R37J.
52. As to Rush Limbaugh, 16 percent report they listen regularly or sometimes. Id. at Question ID
USPSRA. 122104, R46K. Howard Stem attracts 11 percent regularly or sometimes. Id. at Question ID
USPSRA. 122104, R46L.
53. Thirty-four percent responded yes when asked if they ever visit web sites that provide informa-
tion about specific issues or policies that interest them, such as the environment, gun control, abortion,
or health care reform. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.122104, R35. Over a quarter reported that most of
the time they visited websites that share their point of view, 32 percent went to neutral sites, and 21
percent went to sites that challenge their point of view. Id. at Question ID USPSRA. 122104, R41.
54. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, HARRIS INTERACTIVE
ExECUTIVE, CONGRESSIONAL AND CONSUMER ATTITUDES TOWARD MEDIA, MARKETING, AND THE
PUBLIC RELATIONS PROFESSION SURVEY, Question ID USHARRIS.I II 105A, RID (2005).
55. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES NOVEMBER 2002 TRACKING SURVEY, Question ID USPSRA.121302,
RP09EA (2002).
56. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.121302, RP09EB.
57. Fifty percent of those polled responded that they used the intemet to get information about
Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Rita hitting the Gulf Coast and their aftermath. Roper Center at Uni-
versity of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES
INTERNATIONAL INTERNET TRACKING POLL, Question ID USPSRA. 112405, RMO1 (2005). Seventy-
three percent said they used the website of a major news organization such as cnn.com or msnbc.com
to get information about the hurricanes, while 32 percent went to the websites of nonprofits like the
Red Cross or United Way. Id. at Question ID USPSRA. 112405 RM02A. See also Question ID
USPSRA. 112405 RM02E. 17 percent went to Intemet blogs. Id. at Question ID USPSRA. 112405
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In other words, in response to the information explosion and the journalism
implosion, people are choosing to exercise control over what information they are
exposed to. They exercise choice through cable TV, the web, media choice, com-
mentator choice, print or other forms of media. There is no single universal
source for credible information upon which there is a national consensus.
IV. PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: WE Do NOT
TRUST LAWYERS TO TELL THE TRUTH
Early theories of law suggested a logical and rationalist process through
which judges in syllogistic fashion reason from a preexisting set of rules and
propositions (like the forms of Plato) and apply them to a specific set of facts to
generate an almost preordained outcome. With Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and
pragmatism came legal realism. It became more important to examine what
judges actually do, instead of what they say they are doing. 58 Holmes viewed law
as a science engaged in the "prediction of the incidence of public force through
the instrumentality of the courts." 59 Judges are not divine unquestionable sources
of truth, not the prophets of the scriptures, but instead humans who form beliefs
based on evidence and experience and then act on them. Holmes viewed "the law
as a function of need rather than an embodiment of truth."'60 He took the measure
of law away from intent and moral values of good and bad, and substituted no-
tions of effects and repercussions. 61 Holmes became fascinated with the history of
legal rules and the anachronistic nature of their justification. He is seen as a "pre-
cursor of postmodemism" 62 because he was preoccupied "with what survives and
perpetuates itself."63 Later, Holmes saw law as a function of context, embodying
social practices and habits, not reason and evolutionary growth, not objective
truth. 4
The collective body of the judiciary was not notably diverse at the turn of the
century, and more recent theories of law look at how judges coming from a single
racial, gender, cultural, and ethnic lens bring their values and frame of reference
into the process of judging.
A. The Adversary System and Truth
The theory of the modern adversary system is that it produces accurate fact-
finding: it is the best way to find truth. In her account of the drafters' theory
behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judith Resnik observed:
They claimed that the procedures they championed would enable judges
or juries to render fair judgments. The "adversary system" was their
shorthand for the procedures they sought to foster-a lawyer-based proc-
58. DIGGINS, supra note 4, at 350-51.
59. Id. at 344 (quoting Holmes)
60. Id. at 351.
61. Id. at 352.
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 357 (citing Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Realism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787 (1989)).
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ess in which each side was responsible for generating information to be
used either by the parties (to reach an accommodation) or by judges and
juries (to assess and then to impose an outcome). The rules that they
crafted were to enable attorneys, facing off within the tradition of adver-
sarial encounters, to provide information to judges who would, in turn,
produce acceptable (indeed perhaps good) outcomes.65
She described the assumptions behind the rules, that the parties are rational,
have access to resources to generate information, and have lawyers as their agents
who share their interests.66 She observes:
A final, and central, assumption is that competition between balanced oppo-
nents (these autonomous attorney-client units) will lead to the triumph of truth-
or at least to the emergence of insights with normative power.
6 7
This conception embodies a pragmatist epistemology: judges and juries will
use information in partnership with attorney-gatekeepers to form beliefs as to
what is true and to produce good, practical, functional, and fair outcomes.
However, the presumptions underlying this theory may no longer hold. There
has been a growth in the complexity and nature of evidence in the adversary sys-
tem. 68 There has also been a variety of empirical studies to assess the ability of
the jury to engage in accurate fact finding and reliable decision-making in the face
of this complexity; while the results are mixed, there is a growing body of evi-
dence pointing to the inconsistency of outcomes and difficulty jurors report in
assessing scientific and technical information. 69 In the face of this complexity,
jurors use heuristics like the credentials of expert witnesses, their appearance, and
the number of arguments they make. 70 The difficult-to-challenge scientific evi-
dence of experts and increasing use of it, and the problems this creates for accu-
rate fact-finding by juries, is perceived to undermine the effectiveness of the ad-
versarial system. 71 The result has been a series of reforms that move control away
from litigants, or rather away from litigants' attorneys, by giving judges more
control over expert testimony (both the number of experts and the admissibility of
testimony), and by permitting bifurcation of expert testimony on causation from
evidence on culpability.72
65. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 494, 504-
505 (1986).
66. Id. at 513.
67. Id.
68. Joseph Saunders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial
Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 355, 356 (1998) ("[T]he growth of the use of science in court and the
accompanying increase in fact finding complexity have placed pressures on the ability of the civil jury,
embedded in an adversarial set of procedures, to correctly resolve disputes. These pressures are no-
where greater than in the trial of complex (often mass) torts that involve the use of scientific experts.").
69. Id. at 357-66.
70. Id. at 363-64 (citing Joel Cooper et al., Complex Scientific Testimony: How Do Jurors Make
Decisions?, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 379 (1996)).
71. For a review of the empirical research on the use of expert witnesses and jurors grappling with
complex scientific and technical information, see Joseph Saunders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial
by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAuL L. REv. 355 (1998).
72. Id. at 383-84.
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Similarly, there is evidence that elite users, leaders in business and their in-
house counsel have lost faith in the adversary system.73 In an interview and sur-
vey study of executives in large companies, inside counsel and outside counsel,
Professor John Lande documented the prevalent lack of confidence in the process
of adversarial civil justice among executives 74 and to a lesser degree, their inside
counsel. Only outside counsel, whose livelihood depended upon it, had faith in
the adversary system. 76 In all instances, there was a relationship between views of
the adversary system and confidence in the ability of juries and courts to deter-
mine the truth accurately. Those interviewed by Professor Lande complained
about the capacity of juries to make decisions,77 felt that business issues are too
complex for jurors to handle, 78 and felt that in many commercial contracts busi-
ness people waive their right to a jury trial because they are not "willing to trust
twelve peers off the street.,
7 9
B. Loss of Trust in Lawyers
In early Greece, there were both philosophers who were seekers of truth, and
sophists who were masters of rhetoric and built beautiful arguments. Both were
respected. The word sophistry did not have the negative connotation it does to-
day. However, lawyers, the modem professionals who practice rhetoric, are not
trusted to the same degree as other professionals. For example, one national sur-
vey by the Harris Poll found that while 65 percent of the adult population would
trust judges to tell them the truth, only 24 percent would trust lawyers to tell them
the truth.80 Another poll found that only 11 percent of the national adult popula-
tion trusts what lawyers say in their advertisements most of the time; 48 percent
hardly ever or never trust lawyers' advertisements.81 Not only do people not trust
lawyers, but lawyers have also been blamed for loss of social capital and the de-
cline of trust generally.
8 2
73. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executives' Opin-
ions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (1998).
74. Id. at 52 (observing that executives felt litigation "was an untrustworthy mechanism for finding
the truth and producing fair results, especially when juries are involved").
75. Id. at 53 ("[T]hey expressed qualms about the factfinding process, especially by juries" and that
their "faith in litigation was significantly correlated with satisfaction with the results and especially the
process in their experiences with litigation.... In particular, it was related to their critical evaluation of
juries' assessment of damages and the courts' ability to determine the truth.").
76. Id. at 48-50.
77. Id. at 34.
78. Id.
79. Id. ("And that doesn't mean that people are stupid. It means that businesses have become very
complex in many respects.").
80. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, HARRIS POLL, Question ID
USHARRIS. 112702, R IS (2002).
81. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL HEALTH POLL REPORT, Question ID USPSRA.05HPRFB,
R05B (2005).
82. Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005) (reviewing literature on the decline in
social capital in America and its relation to law and lawyers).
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C. Loss of Trust in Public Institutions that Make or Interpret Law
Looking on the bright side, 68 percent of people trust the Supreme Court 'at
least a fair amount,' 83 while the number is 62 percent for Congress84 and 52 per-
cent for the Executive Branch.85 Given a forced choice on what branch of gov-
ernment they trust the most, 33 percent responded the judicial branch, 22 percent
responded the executive branch, and 20 percent responded legislative branch.
86
However, in another national survey, 61 percent responded that they could only
trust the government in Washington to do what is right some of the time or
never.87 When asked why, among other responses, 5 percent responded they mis-
trusted politicians, 5 percent responded that politicians lie, 5 percent said the gov-
ernment withholds information and 10 percent cited politicians' self-interest.
88
The majority of Americans do not trust what politicians say in their advertise-
ments. 89 On the other hand, Americans have become distrustful of people in gen-
eral; another survey reported that only 32 percent responded that you can trust
most people, while 60 percent responded you cannot be too careful.90
V. TRUTH, TRUST, JUSTICE, AND CONTROL OVER INFORMATION
In an environment in which people do not have high levels of trust in each
other or in institutions for determining truth, reporting truth or making policy
decisions based on reality, social science has much to tell us about human behav-
ior. There is a substantial and growing body of research on trust. There is well-
developed literature in social psychology and organizational behavior on percep-
tions of justice, including distributive, procedural, organizational and interactional
forms of justice.
A. Trust
There are two different directions for inquiring about trust and the adversary
system. People must decide whether to trust each other in a transaction or interac-
tion that may yield a dispute that later ends up in the courts, and then whether to
trust each other in a settlement. People must also decide whether they trust the
institutions for resolving this dispute. Professor Cross suggests that the law can
83. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, GALLUP POLL, Question ID
USGALLUP.092805, R14B (2005).
84. Id. at Question ID USGALLUP.092805, R14C.
85. Id. at Question ID USGALLUP.092805, R 14A.
86. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, Fox NEWS/OPINION
DYNA iCs POLL, Question ID USODFOX.061605, R07 (2005).
87. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, CBS NEWS NEW YORK TIMES
POLL, Question ID USCBSNYT.090702B, R08B (2002).
88. Id.
89. Id. at Question ID USPSRA.05HPRFB, R05G.
90. Roper Center at University of Connecticut Public Opinion Online, PRINCETON SURVEY
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES INTERNET TRACKING POLL, Question ID USPSRA.102203, R02 (2003);
Cross, supra note 82, at 1471-72 (reviewing Robert Putnam's BOWLING ALONE and the data on the
decline in the percentage of Americans who say "most people can be trusted," from a peak in 1962 of
55 percent to a low of 33 percent among adults and 25 percent among high school students).
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enhance social capital and trust for economic transactions; he identifies emotional
affective and rational cognitive dimensions of trust.91 He examines how the rule
of law can build societal trust and trust between parties to a contract or transac-
tion.92
Lewicki and Wiethoff report that trust has also been the subject of research by
multiple social science disciplines: personality theorists look at individual dispo-
sition to trust; sociologists and economists look at trust in and among institutions
based on interactions; and social psychologists look at interpersonal and inter-
group transactions that foster or inhibit trust. 93 Trust is related to information,
belief and truth because it is defined as both belief in a person and a willingness to
act upon what they say or do.94 They suggest that there are significant differences
between trust and distrust; these are not simply different quantities of the same
thing.95 Trust is "confident positive expectations" regarding another, while dis-
trust is "confident negative expectations. 96 Trust is a function of relationship; the
more multifaceted the relations and the more interactions in a wider array of set-
tings, the more complex the relationship and greater opportunities to develop
trust. 97 Trust and distrust can exist simultaneously. 9 8 There are two significant
dimensions to trust. First, people can calculate trust based on impersonal interac-
tions and a kind of personal costlbenefit analysis; Lewicki and Wiethoff call this
'calculus-based trust.' 99 It bears similarities to the rational or cognitive dimension
of trust.'0° Second, people develop trust based on identifying with another per-
son's values and goals; this is "identification-based trust."'' It bears similarities
to the emotional and affective dimension.
1°2
These definitions suggest a problem for the adversary system. The polls re-
ported above show that we have become in general a people with a tendency to
distrust others. In relation to the civil trial court, it would seem difficult for the
average litigant to build either calculus-based or identity-based trust in the court as
an institution. Many litigants are one-shot players who file one lawsuit in their
lifetime, and few of these ever see the inside of a courtroom.'0 3 They cannot build
either calculus-based or identity-based trust through repeated interactions. For
91. Cross, supra note 82 (arguing that the law can help build trust, particularly in creating conditions
in which expectations concerning contracts are reliably met and enforced).
92. Id. at 1514 (arguing that "strong control systems" enhance trust "among those governed by the
systems," and providing a review of the empirical literature regarding such systems and trust between
potential disputants or litigants).
93. See Roy J. Lewicki & Carolyn Wiethoff, Trust, Trust Development, and Trust Repair, in THE
HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 86-87 (Morton Deutsch & Peter T. Coleman eds., 2000) (pro-
viding an excellent review that synthesizes the research from multiple social science disciplines).
94. Id. at 87 ("[W]e adopt as the definition of trust "an individual's belief in, and willingness to act
on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another.").





100. Cross, supra note 82, at 1513.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95 (1974) (describing the relative advantages of repeat players over
one-shot players in the civil justice system).
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that matter, neither can institutional corporate repeat players. Their managers are
the ones who appear in court. Lande found that these managers had little experi-
ence with court, and not much good to say about those experiences. 104 Neither
one-shot players nor repeat players' management employees have much to iden-
tify with in the legal system; their in-house and outside lawyers may have iden-
tity-based trust in the system, 10 5 but the litigants themselves have no reason to. To
build identity-based trust, researchers suggest parties should interact by sharing
values, perceptions, motives and goals, or be in situations where they stand to-
gether;1 6 litigants cannot do this much with the jury or the court as an institution.
Since most litigants cannot form their own relationships and conclusions
based on repeated experience with players in the adversary system, they may look
to proxies, heuristics, and vicarious experience. In the alternative, it may be easier
to rebuild trust in the other disputant than in the institution for resolving the dis-
pute. I07
B. Justice
Justice theory in social science examines peoples' perceptions of fairness in,
and satisfaction with, the process and outcome of institutions to resolve conflict.
Socio-legal scholars have developed theories of distributive, procedural, and in-
teractional justice in contexts ranging from the courts to the workplace.
1. Distributive Justice
Distributive justice has its roots in social equity theory. It posits that social
behavior occurs in response to the distribution of outcomes. Distributive justice
emphasizes fairness in the allocation of outcomes. Thus, in mediation research,
distributive justice suggests that satisfaction is a function of outcome, specifically
the fact and content of a settlement or resolution. In theory, participants are more
satisfied when they believe that the settlement is fair and favorable. There is a
substantial body of empirical research that supports the distributive justice model
as an explanation of satisfaction. 10 8 The research suggests that distributive justice
is a better explanation for satisfaction related to conflicts over resource allocation,
such as wage disputes than other cases in which fairness matters.
104. Lande, supra note 73, at 39 (observing that managers, in-house lawyers, and outside lawyers all
believed that top executives and organizational superiors believe the civil justice system is working
poorly).
105. Id. at 49-50 (observing that outside counsel had generally favorable views of litigation and were
pleased with the results, and that faith in litigation was strongly related to their satisfaction with the
process of litigation and their personal experience).
106. LEWiCKi & WIETrHOFF, supra note 93, at 97.
107. Cross, supra note 82, at 1509 (examining both directions of trusting relationships, and argues
that the law can help build interpersonal or affective trust by creating the conditions under which
parties act consistently with expectations as reflected for example in contracts).
108. DEAN G. PRurrr, NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR (1981); HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
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2. Procedural Justice
Procedural justice refers to participants' perceptions about the fairness of the
rules and procedures that regulate a process. In contrast to distributive justice,
which suggests that satisfaction is a function of outcome (the content of the deci-
sion or resolution), procedural justice suggests that satisfaction is a function of the
process (the steps taken to reach that decision). Among the traditional principles
of procedural justice are impartiality, voice or opportunity to be heard, and
grounds for decisions. 1 0 Procedural issues such as neutrality of the process and
decision-maker,"1 ' treatment of the participants with dignity and respect, "12 and
the trustworthiness of the decision-making authority"1 3 are important to enhancing
perceptions of procedural justice. Extensive literature supports procedural justice
theories of satisfaction in a variety of contexts involving both courts and dispute
resolution."l 4 In general, research suggests that if organizational processes and
procedures are perceived to be fair, participants will be more satisfied, more will-
ing to accept the resolution of that procedure, and more likely to form positive
attitudes about the organization."1
5
3. Interactional Justice
Beginning in the 1980s, organizational justice researchers developed the no-
tion of interactional justice, defined as the quality of interpersonal treatment re-
ceived during the enactment of organizational procedures."16 In general, interac-
tional justice reflects concerns about the fairness of the non-procedurally dictated
aspects of interaction. Research has identified two components of interactional
justice: interpersonal justice and informational justice. 117 These two components
overlap considerably. However, empirical research suggests that they should be
109. William G. Austin, & Joyce M. Tobiasen, Legal justice and the psychology of conflict resolu-
tion, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES. (R. Folger ed, 1984); JOHN
THIBAUT & W. LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975)
[hereinafter THIBAUT, PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS].
110. M. D. BAYLES, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: ALLOCATING TO INDIVIDUALS (1990).
111. Tom R Tyler & E. Allan. Lind, A relational model of authority in groups, in ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 25, 115-92 (M. Zanna ed., 1992) [hereinafter Tyler, Relational
Model].
112. Robert J. Bies & J. S. Moag, Interactional Justice: Communication Criteria of Fairness, in.
RESEARCH ON NEGOTIATION IN ORGANIZATIONS, 43-55 (R. J. Lewicki et al. eds., 1986) [hereinafter
Bies, Interactional Justice]; E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) [hereinafter LIND, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE].
113. Tyler, Relational Model, supra note 111.
114. LIND, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 112; E. Allan Lind et al., In the eye of the beholder:
Tort litigants' evaluations of their experience in the civil justice system, 24 LAW & SOCIETY REV.,
953-96 (1990).
115. LIND, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, supra note 112; Tyler, Relational Model, supra note 111.
116. Bies, Interactional Justice, supra note 112, at 44.
117. R. FOLGER, & R. CROPANZANO,. ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT (1998); Tom Tyler & Robert J. Bies, Beyond formal procedures: The interpersonal
context of procedural justice, in APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL SETTINGS 77-98
(J. Carroll ed., 1990) [hereinafter Bies, Formal Procedures].
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considered separately as each has differential and independent effects upon per-
ceptions of justice.1 18
a. Informational Justice
Informational justice focuses on the enactment of decision-making proce-
dures. Research suggests that explanations about the procedures used to deter-
mine outcomes enhance perceptions of informational justice.119 Explanations
provide the information needed to evaluate the structural aspects of the process
and how it is enacted. 20 However, for explanations to be perceived as fair they
must be recognized as sincere and communicated without ulterior motives, 121 be
based on sound reasoning with logically relevant information,122and be deter-
mined by legitimate rather than arbitrary factors. 1
23
b. Interpersonal Justice
Interpersonal justice reflects the degree to which people are treated with po-
liteness, dignity, and respect by authorities. The experience of interpersonal jus-
tice can alter reactions to decisions, because sensitivity can make people feel bet-
ter about an unfavorable outcome. 124 Interpersonal treatment includes interper-
sonal communication, 125 truthfulness, respect, propriety of questions, and justifi-
cation, 26 and honesty, courtesy, timely feedback, and respect for rights.'
27
118. Jason A. Colquitt, On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct validation of a
measure, 86(3) J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 386-400; Jason A Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A
Meta-Analytic Review of 25 Years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425-
45 [hereinafter Colquitt et al., Millennium].
119. Robert J. Bies, The predicament of injustice: The management of moral outrage, in RESEARCH
IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 9, 289-319 ( L. Cummings & B. M Staw eds., 1987.); Robert J. Bies,
& Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and justification: Their influence on procedural fairness judgments, 31
ACAD. MGmT. J. 676-85 (1988); Jerald Greenberg, Organizational justice: Yesterday, today, and
tomorrow, 16 J. MGMT 399-432; Debra L. Shapiro, Reconciling theoretical differences among proce-
dural justice researchers by re-evaluating what it means to have one's views "considered": Implica-
tions for third-party managers, in JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE: APPROACHING FAIRNESS IN HUMAN
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 51-78 (1993); Bies, Formal Procedures, supra note 117, at 77-98.
120. Colquitt et al., Millenium, supra note 118; Jerald Greenberg, The social side of fairness: Inter-
personal and informational classes of organizational justice, in JUSTICE IN THE WORKPLACE:
APPROACHING FAIRNESS IN HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (Russell Cropanzano ed., 1993) [herein-
after Greenberg, Social Side]; Jerald Greenberg, Using socially fair treatment to promote acceptance
of a work site smoking ban, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 288-97 (1994) [hereinafter Greenberg, Smoking
Ban].
121. Robert J Bies, Debra L. Shapiro & L. L. Cummings, Causal accounts and managing organiza-
tional conflict: Is it enough to say it's not my fault?, 15 COMM. RES. 381-99 (1988).
122. Debra L. Shapiro & H. B. Buttner, Adequate explanations: What are they, and do they enhance
procedural justice under severe outcome circumstances? (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Academy of Management, Anaheim, CA., 1988).
123. R. Folger, D. Rosenfield, & T. Robinson, Relative deprivation and procedural justification, 45 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL., 268-73 (1983).
124. Colquitt et al., Millenium, supra note 118; Greenberg, Social Side, supra note 120; Greenberg,
Smoking Ban, supra note 120.
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4. Control, Group Value, and Fairness Heuristic Theories
There are three psychological models that explain these research results: con-
trol theory, 12 8 group value theory, 2 9 and fairness heuristic theory. 130 Control the-
ory is related to social-exchange theory and posits that decision control allows
disputants to shape the final outcome while process control allows them to present
evidence and arguments that will in turn affect outcome.' 3 ' Group value theory
suggests that people value fair process (neutrality and respectful, dignified treat-
ment) because it signals their value and standing within a social group. 132 In early
models, the trustworthiness of the third party authority was an element of per-
ceived fairness.' 3 3 Most recently, fairness heuristic theory suggests that people
use information about perceptions of fair outcome or fair process as a shortcut, or
heuristic, to deciding whether an authority can be trusted. 34 In other words, jus-
tice theory is explaining why fairness is important; it is a short cut to trust. Pro-
fessor MacCoun suggests that the fairness heuristic theory of research has "almost
no notice in the law and social science literature."''
35
C. Control, Uncertainty, and Trust
The experience of control is an important component of justice. Fairness
heuristic theory suggests that what we are trying to manage and control is funda-
mentally uncertainty.' 36 Control over outcome is managing uncertainty about
what an authority figure may direct disputants to do. Control over process is con-
trol over the information that the authority figure may use to reach a decision
about outcome. Both forms of control are means of trying to cope with uncer-
tainty about the future. Efforts at control become a rational response in an era
when we face heightened uncertainty because we have too much information, too
many sources, a loss of consensus over which sources to trust, and insecurity
about the ability of anyone to determine what is real and true.
128. THIBAUT, PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 109.
129. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group Value Model, 57 J. OF
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 830 (1989) [hereinafter Tyler, Group Value Model].
130. Kees van den Bos & Allan Lind, Uncertainty Management by Means of Fairness Judgments, 34
ADvANCES IN EXP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1 (2002). For a review of the literature, see Robert J. MacCoun,
Voice, Control, and Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, 1 ANNUAL
REVIEW OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 171-201 (Volume publication date Dec. 2005), accessed at
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIETY JURISPRUDENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY PROGRAM,
JSP/CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIETY FACULTY WORKING PAPERS, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, PAPER 30 (2005) available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/csls/
fwp/30 (last visited Mar. 14, 2006).
131. MACCOUN, supra note 130.
132. Tyler, Relational Model, supra note 111.
133. Tyler, Group Value Model, supra note 129, at 831.
134. Kees van den Bos, Uncertainty Management: The Influence of Uncertainty Salience on Reac-
tions to Perceived Procedural Fairness, 80 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 931 (2001); see also
MacCoun, supra note 130.
135. MacCoun, supra note 130, at 16.
136. Van den Bos, supra note 130; MacCoun, supra note 130, at 16 ("Fairness heuristic theory starts
with a proposition that has motivated many other psychological theories, the notion that people have a
fundamental need to reduce uncertainty about the future.").
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VI. DISPUTE RESOLUTION AS A MEANS OF CONTROLLING INFORMATION
AND REDUCING UNCERTAINTY
Resnik observes that the move to settlement may be based in part "upon the
devaluation of adjudication as it is currently conducted with lawyer-based infor-
mation generation and presentation."'' 37 Mediation and arbitration, as forms of
dispute resolution, leave much more control over the flow of information in the
hands of the disputants-as distinguished from their lawyers-than does the tradi-
tional trial in the adversary system. There is no question that the use of mediation
and arbitration has grown dramatically in the past three decades.' 38 Eight years
ago, Professor Lande explored perceptions of the civil justice system among elite
users and suggested that private dispute resolution may be one method for ad-
dressing 'failing faith.' 1
39
A. Mediation and the Trial Compared
1. Gatekeepers
In Adversary Legalism, Professor Robert Kagan characterizes the American
legal system along two dimensions, formality and participation, in comparison to
other national systems. Kagan argues it is more formal and, at the same time,
more participative than the civil code tradition. It is formal in its rules of civil
procedure and evidence; it is participative because the disputants themselves de-
termine what evidence to present to the judge and jury, and how best to present it.
The judge has far less knowledge about the case at the outset of a trial in the ad-
versary common law system than in the civil code system.
While this much is true, it is also true that the disputants rarely participate
alone; they do not choose what evidence to present in a vacuum. To the contrary,
the trial bar provides the gatekeepers who control this flow of information. Gate-
keepers control information in two directions: they determine what information
about the case a judge or jury will ever see or hear, and they determine what in-
formation about the adversary system and trial process their clients receive. They
coach their clients as witnesses; clients learn that simply telling what they know in
their own words may not be good enough. In fact, it may not be permitted. Some
of what they know or believe may be inadmissible as hearsay, for example. Simi-
larly, clients learn that all of their witnesses are coached, as are the witnesses for
the other side. Lawyers are in control of information flow, not clients. There is
evidence that this control over a disputant's ability to participate has an impact on
satisfaction with a process. In a study of mediation participants and their repre-
sentatives, participants reported both higher satisfaction with their ability to par-
ticipate and higher satisfaction with mediation when they represented themselves
137. Resnik, supra note 65, at 537.
138. Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact of "Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRiCAL LEGAL STUD. 843 (2004).
139. Lande, supra note 73, at 55-66.
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or had union representatives rather than when they had lawyers as their represen-
tatives.14°
In general, participation in dispute resolution allows clients more direct and
personal control over the flow of information than they have in litigation. In both
mediation and arbitration, clients may represent themselves or bring a layperson
advocate or friend. It is common for domestic relations clients to consult with
their lawyers, but then participate in divorce mediation without them. In media-
tion of discrimination claims, employees may choose to represent themselves.
This is easier to do than acting as a pro se litigant and gives the client much more
control over what information comes into the dispute resolution process. There
are no gatekeepers to tell you what you should and should not say and no one to
stop you from apologizing because it is an admission against interest.
2. Rules of evidence
Dispute resolution processes are also less formal, so there are fewer rules to
act as barriers to information that clients believe is relevant. The rules of evidence
evolved to constrain what information is submitted to a judge or jury as part of an
adversary trial. They exist to keep certain information away from a jury because
of the risk that the jury will not use that information appropriately. Hearsay rules
in particular have this purpose.
In contrast, during arbitration the neutral routinely admits hearsay "for what it
is worth." During mediation, there is no question of rules of evidence because it
is not a fact-finding proceeding leading to a third party's decision. Instead, it is a
process of negotiation and persuasion, in which all forms of information arguably
can be discussed. Nothing is off the table-no information excluded-unless the
parties mutually agree not to discuss it.
3. Confidentiality
One element of control over information is the question of who else has ac-
cess to it. A trial is a public event.' 4 1 A jury trial is a form of public participation
to ensure that democratic values are brought to bear in the enforcement of our
law. 142 Jury nullification is an important check on the power of government. 43 In
jury nullification, the jury can refuse to find guilty a defendant who engaged in
civil disobedience of an unjust law. The layperson's values, as a citizen on a jury,
are relevant and intended to represent the voting public.
140. Lisa B. Bingham, Kiwhan Kim & Susan Summers Raines, Exploring the Role of Representation
in Employment Mediation at the USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 341 (2002).
141. Resnik, supra note 65, at 553-54 ("[Olne of the saving graces of adjudication is its 'public di-
mension'-the accountability and education which flow from its public, visible nature-I have more
qualms about mediators than I do about summary jury trials....") [citations omitted].
142. For this reason, some civil code jurisdictions that are in transition from more authoritarian to
more democratic forms and practices of government are beginning to experiment with the jury. For a
discussion on these developments in the Republic of Korea [South Korea], see Lisa Blomgren Bing-
ham, Sun Woo Lee & Won Kyung Chang, Legal Infrastructure and Dispute Resolution: The Case of
South Korea, TRANSNATIONAL LAWYER _ (forthcoming 2006).
143. Resnik, supra note 65, at 545-46 ("When juries decide, no reasons must be given; the commu-
nity's judgment, expressed by this ad hoc political institution, required no explanation.").
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In contrast, in dispute resolution, the parties have the process to themselves.
In mediation and arbitration, with some limited exceptions, 144 the meetings, com-
munications, and products in terms of settlements or awards are all confidential
unless the parties agree to disclose them. 145 The parties control what they disclose
to each other in mediation, and what they disclose to others after the process. The
parties get to negotiate over the scope and degree of discovery in arbitration, and
they have more control over the arbitrator in managing what information is sub-
mitted during the process.
4. Lay and Expert Evidence
An adversary trial may become a battle of the experts. Increasingly, evidence
from scientific or technical experts is necessary to resolve factual disputes. 146 In
mediation, the parties may decide to exclude expert evidence, admit lay evidence,
or stipulate to a system for getting the assistance they need.147 In many mediation
models, disputants are encouraged to bring to the table the information they be-
lieve to be important.
5. Discovery
Discovery is the formal process for getting access to information in the hands
of the other side in the adversary process. A strength of the adversary process is
that judges can force disputants to disclose unfavorable evidence. However, if a
disputant does not wish to disclose that evidence, they may be able to avoid doing
so through mediation. 148  Similarly, while arbitration of certain categories of
cases, such as big commercial disputes, is becoming more formalized and legalis-
tic with as much discovery as a civil trial, it is also possible for parties to negotiate
the scope of discovery. The arbitrator may order reasonable discovery, but this
power is narrower in scope than that of a judge. In most arbitration cases, there is
less use of discovery than in court. However, discovery is subject to abuse and
trial court adjudication may produce an unnecessary amount of information. 149
6. Emotions Versus Facts
An adversary trial is a process for finding the facts; emotion may leak in
through the sympathetic (or unsympathetic) client, but this is a strategic use of
emotion to sway a jury. In contrast, in mediation, emotion is often central to the
144. In the public sector, certain processes to which government is a party are governed by freedom
of information or sunshine laws. For a discussion of confidentiality in the federal sector, see Jeffrey
Senger, FEDERAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 177-99 (2004).
145. See Federal Interagency ADR Working Group, Draft Confidentiality Guide, available at
http://www.adr.gov/draftguides.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
146. Joseph Saunders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of Adversarial
Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 355 (1998).
147. Adler & Birkhoff USIECR paper
148. Resnik, supra note 65, at 538 ("[Mlany defendants (and their attorneys) in products liability and
antitrust cases have championed the curtailment of discovery and now seem intrigued by ADR as a
means of protecting themselves from negative publicity and from outcomes they have disliked.")
149. Id. at 554.
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dispute process. This is yet another form of information that is permitted to a
much greater degree in mediation than in court.
7. Values Versus Law
In mediation, and even to some extent in arbitration, the disputants retain con-
trol over the standard by which they wish information to be evaluated. In courts,
the law defines the decision standards. A fired employee may be faced with at-
will employment; her recourse may be limited to public law defining prohibited
discrimination. However, the underlying cause of the dispute has to do with a
sense of injustice and unfair treatment by a supervisor not cognizable under law.
In mediation, the disputants may engage in a discussion of values that are outside
the bounds of the law. In arbitration, the disputants can define a decision standard
such as just cause, one that is a creature of contract and not a mandated legal stan-
dard. Of course, this power to define the standards can also be used in adhesive
arbitration plans to unbalance the playing field.
1 50
8. Moral Standards, How Defined and by Whom
If the law has become more concerned with what judges do and the conse-
quences of human behavior, and less concerned with morality in the sense of the
great religious traditions, that does not mean the people who are subject to the law
necessarily agree. In mediation, it is possible for disputants to hold each other's
conduct up to moral standards they believe to be relevant. They can have a dis-
cussion about these standards. The parties can define these moral standards.
9. Control Over the Neutral
In the adversarial system, there is little control over which judge or jury will
handle your case. In comparison, in arbitration, one or both parties have control
over the selection of either the arbitrator, private judge, or arbitration panel who
will decide the outcome. The parties can make this decision based upon the ex-
pertise of the fact-finder. There is substantial empirical evidence that control over
information and the decision-maker is important in the choice of ADR over adver-
sarial system.15 1 Mandatory arbitration, whether binding or advisory, represents
the exercise of control by one party. Through the use of an adhesive contract, one
party may impose its choice of decision-maker on the other. 1
52
In voluntary mediation, the parties have not given the neutral control over the
outcome, but they are ceding control over the process. Thus, the choice of media-
tor is an important dimension of process control. Not only can the parties choose
whom to trust as their mediator, they have the opportunity to explore different
models and mediation styles. They can manage uncertainty about outcome be-
150. Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Control Over Dispute Design and Mandatory Commercial Arbitration,
67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 221 (2004).
151. Lande, supra note 73.
152. Bingham, supra note 150 (arguing that control over dispute system design allows one party to
shift transaction costs through adhesive contracts).
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cause they retain control over it. They can manage what information to share in
mediation in part through selection of the mediator and mediation model. In all
respects, they have more control in their interactions with an arbitrator and media-
tor than they would with a judge or jury.
VII. CONCLUSION
This effort only begins to explore the relationship between changes in our re-
lation to information, the resulting uncertainty and loss of trust, and its impact on
the civil trial. We are swimming in new oceans of information. At the same time,
we are less willing to agree with each other on what is credible, real, or true. We
hold no truths to be self-evident. The civil trial is something with which few liti-
gants have direct experience. They cannot form a belief about whether to trust the
system based on that experience. They need to use heuristics. Controlling uncer-
tainty to the greatest extent possible is one shortcut. Among other means of con-
trolling uncertainty, dispute resolution allows litigants to manage the flow of in-
formation directly. It gives them wider latitude to assert what they believe to be
true. Perhaps that has greater value to people than a day in court.
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